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Abstract
When fishing gears alter the composition of fish populations or modify the recruitment
rate, it is advisable to include the degree of their fishing selectivity in the analysis.
Fishing  selectivity  can  cause  two  different  management  problems:  interspecies
selectivity or by‐catch of fish stocks for which no quota has been set by the regulator.
The case study is the Spanish fishery of hake (Merlucius merlucius), where the fleet
operates using two main gears; most of the vessels are trawlers but a few boats use
longlines and other fixed gears. Fishery management by means of effort taxes and how
the  degree  of  intraspecies  selectivity  may  affect  the  resource  and  tax  levels  are
analyzed. The results show that the tax level will depend on the social value of the
marine stock, the marginal productivity of each fleet's effort, and the effect that the
fishing activity of each one has on the growth of the hake biomass.
Keywords: European hake, fisheries management, multigear fishery, tax, Spanish fish‐
ery, fishing selectivity
1. Introduction
From an economic point of view, fishery resources are assets that provide flows of income over
time but show certain characteristics. These are linked with the renewable character of fish
stocks, the institutional structure under which the activity takes place, and the existence of
externalities in the use of a resource. Bioecological rules are essential to determine the functions
of production and meet the necessary biological restrictions in an objective function optimi‐
zation. However, the institutional conditions in the fish stock exploitation establish who is
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entitled to  capture  that  resource and under  what  circumstances,  and this  is  essential  to
understand and predict the behavior of the economic agents involved in the economic activity
(the fishermen) and properly drive any regulatory intervention.
Concern for the implications associated with the extraction of marine resources is relatively
recent; scarcity problems were largely associated with nonrenewable natural resources until
the mid‐twentieth century. From then on, the fishing economy has developed quickly. This can
be explained by the increasing concerns for the conservation of resources to the perception of
degradation of nature and the environment. The effects of the decisions taken at the Third
Conference of UN on Law of the Sea in the mid‐1970s also have influenced this development,
as it recognized the extension of fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles from coastal line and trans‐
forming the status of fishery resources from free access to the exclusive property of coastal
states.
Marine resource exploitation is one of the typical examples of the tragedy of the commons in
which the logic of individual maximization of benefits leads to a continual increase in pressure
on the resources and their consequent overexploitation. As the population has expanded, the
problem of a lack of resources has become more evident. Society has increasingly valued
natural and environmental resources. Key institutional figures have become more necessary
for establishing more efficient and sustainable management of natural resources to prevent a
tragedy of the commons. Thus, the study of the commons is relevant when analyzing common
ownership or open access systems, but its conceptual significance goes far beyond these
concrete systems because it represents the starting point in the search to understand the rise
and formation of institutions.
These characteristics pose specific management problems for those who need to build
theoretical formalization different from those used for the rest of economic assets and those
who must be focused on the determination of optimal trajectories for the exploitation of the
renewable natural resources sustainably over time. The marine resources must be managed in
a rational way, especially if the welfare of future generations is taken into account in the
decision‐making process.
In a fishery where two or more fleets are using several fishing technologies or gears, it is useful
to assume that fishing activity influences the net natural dynamics of the marine resources
through the catches, whereas the natural growth function depends on the fish biomass and
environmental conditions, and these are taken as stable and constants over time in the
specialized literature [1–4]. However, in some fisheries (as the Spanish hake fishery), several
fishing technologies could alter the composition of fish populations or modify the recruitment
rate [5]. In this case, it is advisable to include the degree of their fishing selectivity in the study.
The selectivity could cause two different management problems: interspecies selectivity or by‐
catch of fish stocks for which no quota has been set by the regulator [6–9].
The case study is the Spanish fishery of European hake (Merlucius merlucius) in Ibero‐Atlantic
grounds. The Spanish fleet involved in this fishery operates uses two main gears; most of
vessels are trawlers, but a few boats use longlines and other fixed gears (majority gillnets).
Trawlers harvest mainly young individuals of hake of a lower size than that corresponding to
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sexual maturity (although it too catches mature fish). The other fishing technology (artisanal
fleet) catches only mature fish. Based on this, we focus on the intraselectivity problem. We
introduce in the analysis of the management of the fishery by means of effort taxes [10–16].
On the contrary, and given that the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES;
this institution analyzes the stock situation and proposes management measures to the
European regulator) and the European Commission (EC) recommend that one of the two
technologies involved in the hake fishery (in particular, trawling fleet) improves the level of
fishing selectivity and aim to individuals of a larger size, we pose several scenarios and study
how the levels of hake stock and the tax applied to each group of vessels would be affected.
The results obtained show that the optimum tax level depends not only on the social value of
the marine resource and the marginal productivity of each fleet's effort but also on the effect
that the fishing activity of each one has on the growth of the hake biomass. Furthermore, and
as the fleet that is less conservationist with the stock (trawlers) improves the degree of
selectivity of its technology, the equilibrium fishing effort level for this fleet increases and the
optimum tax falls, to the detriment of the stationary values corresponding to the other fleet.
The particular issue with which this chapter is concerned is how the degree of intraspecies
selectivity may affect the hake stock and tax levels. The chapter is structured as follows: the
Spanish fishery is described in Section 2. A simple management model applied to the fishery
is analyzed in Section 3. The primary results are summarized in Section 4. Lastly, the chapter
concludes with the discussion presented in Section 5.
2. Description of the fishery
The M. merlucius species is listed within the group of demersal beings and therefore a fish stock
of long life. Although it is distributed in the area located between the coast north of Morocco
and the North Sea, the ICES valued it separately since 1979, distinguishing two biological units:
Northern stock (corresponding to zones IV, VI, and VII and divisions VIIIa and VIIIb; see
Figure 1) and Southern stock (divisions VIIIc and IXa). Thus, these two stocks are considered
by European regulators as two different management units. This is due to the existence of two
well‐differentiated recruitment areas: one on the west coast of France (Northern stock) and the
other on the coast northwest of the Iberian Peninsula (Southern stock).
The fishery we are studying is European hake in ICES divisions VIIIc and IXa, better known
as the Southern stock of European hake. The juvenile individuals of European hake mainly
feed on zooplankton and decapod prawns (Nephrops norvegicus). Larger hake feed predomi‐
nantly on fish, with blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou) being the most important prey in
waters deeper than 100 m. Horse mackerel (Trauchurus trauchurus) and mackerel (Scomber
scombrus) are the most important prey species in shallower waters. Hake are known to be
cannibalistic species located at the top of the food chain. European hake recruitment processes
lead to patches of juveniles found in the localized areas of the Iberian continental shelf.
European hake concentrations could vary in density according to the strength of the year class;
however, they remain generally stable in size and spatial location. The ICES estimates that the
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spatial patterns could be related to environmental conditions. On the eastern shelf of the
Cantabrian Sea, years of large inflow of the shelf‐edge current have produced low recruitment
rates due to larvae and pre‐recruits being transported away from spawning areas. The recent
high recruitment has not yet been linked to an environmental process.
Figure 1. ICES zones. Source: Spanish Oceanographic Institute.
European hake in ICES divisions VIIIc and IXa is caught in a mixed fishery by trawlers and
artisanal vessels. The trawling fleet is homogeneous and uses mainly two gears: pair trawl and
bottom trawl. The artisanal fleet is quite heterogeneous and uses a wide variety of fixed gears,
mainly large and small fixed gillnets and longlines. The amount of hake in the landings of
Spanish trawlers is low in relative terms. However, trawling vessels provide by 55% of the
total Spanish hake landings for last years. These fishing gears affect the hake biomass in
different ways. Trawling, although it catches individuals of all ages, has a negative impact on
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young individuals preventing them from reaching adulthood. The more traditional method,
however, affects mainly mature fish and is less damaging to the hake stock.
Trawl fleet is one of the most important fleets among those operating on the Spanish Atlantic
continental shelf in terms of landings value. The standard vessel has approximately 145 GRT
of fishing capacity and 330 kW of engine power, is close to 28 m long, has 9 crew members,
and has an average age of 20 years. The main target species are hake, megrim, anglerfish,
lobster, and horse mackerel. The longline and gillnet fleet is less important than the trawler
fleet and the standard vessel has approximately 35 GRT and 150 kW, is close to 20 m long, has
5 crew members, and has an average age of 18 years.
Figure 2. Spawning stock biomass (SSB) and landings. Data in tons. 1988–2013. Source: Own compilation from ICES.
The European Union (EU), within the framework of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP),
manages European hake fishery with total allowable catch (TAC), mainly set based on
biological criteria. In addition to TACs, EU implements minimum sizes of catches for hake
since 1987 and closed areas. The Spanish Government sets a closed list of vessels of each fishing
fleet for the last decades. Furthermore, and in the face of the poor biological situation of the
stock (see Figure 2), since 2006, a recovery plan has been implemented, aimed at recovering
the spawning biomass above precautionary biomass and reducing fishing mortality to 0.27
[17]. To do so, the EC, while continuing with the establishment of downward TAC, proposes
to reduce the effort exercised in the fishery and includes the improvement in the selectivity of
some of the fishing methods.
Regarding the Southern stock of European hake, we have obtained information from the ICES
on the spawning biomass for the period 1985 to 2014. Figure 2 shows how the hake biomass
has decreased to such an extent in the late 1990s, as it reached only 25% of that which existed
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in the early 1980s, falling well outside the biological safety limits in spite of the recovery
experienced in the last 3 years [18]. This hake biomass evolution indicates that the resource is
being exploited to excess. With respect to the total catches, we can see that it has shown a
decreasing trend in the said period and in keeping with the deterioration of the fish biomass
(see Figure 2).
The trends in both variables show that the measures adopted by the EU were not sufficient to
avoid the overexploitation of hake stock and the resource is still being overfished in the last
years. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce a regulatory mechanism to manage the hake
fishery in a sustainable way to avoid the overexploitation of resource and depletion of the fish
stock.
3. Method
If the regulator of fishery establishes a tax on effort (τi), both fleets will assume an increase in
the unit cost of the effort and will be faced with the following problem:
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where p, w, h, e, and X denote the unit price of hake, unit cost of effort, total landings, fishing
effort, and fish stock, respectively. The parameter δ represents the discount rate.
The usual natural growth function of the marine resource (F) is modified by a new parameter
θ, which catches the selectivity of both fleets. The fish stock dynamic is shown as follows:
( , )  F( )t t t tG X Xq q= (2)
where F(·) is the natural growth function of the resource. The effects that the different
technologies have on it are defined as follows [19]:
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where the parameter γi(0≤γi<1, i=1,2) shows the level of fishing selectivity of each technology
or fleet. If the i‐fleet technology has no effects on the fish stock dynamics, the fleet shows a high
selectivity level and this fleet can be considered as conservationist with the marine resource.
In this case, the parameter γi takes on a zero value. In contrast, if technology has effects on the
marine stock dynamics in a negative way, the fleet shows a nonselective level and it can be
considered as a less conservationist fleet with the fish stock. Therefore, the fishing selectivity
parameter will approach the unit value.
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From one of the first‐order conditions to resolve the problem (1) [20], the following equation
is obtained:
i
i i
i
h (.)   = w  +          =1,2eip it
¶
¶ (4)
In the absence of regulation (i.e., no tax would be implemented), we would obtain the following
expression [19]:
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and if both expressions (4) and (5) are compared, the optimum tax value can be obtained (i=1,2):
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This expression indicates that the tax level depends not only on the social value of the marine
resource (μ) and the marginal productivity of the effort (∂hi/∂ei) but also on the effect on the
natural growth of the resource (∂G(·)/∂ei). On the contrary, the lower (higher) the marginal
productivity of the fleet i, the lower (higher) the tax level that will have to be paid to fish in the
fishery.
On the contrary, and for γi≠γj, if fleet i shows a high (low) selectivity level and with γi < γj (γi
> γj), then γi→0 (γi→1) and the effect of the activity of i on the natural growth function will be
lower (higher), allowing a greater (smaller) growth of the fish population, that is, (γj–γi)> 0
((γj – γi) < 0) and ∂G(·)/ ∂ei > 0 (∂G(·)/ ∂ei < 0). Consequently, given that ∂hi(·) > 0, the tax level for
this fleet will be higher (lower) than that which corresponds to the other fleet.
4. Estimations
Because fishing effort (fishing days) data are not available separately for the trawling and
artisanal fleets for the last 10 years, we will use the parameter values estimated by Garza‐Gil
and Varela‐Lafuente [19] for this fishery, who made an econometric estimation through the
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method with annual observations for 20 years and for different
options of the natural resource dynamic and the production functions. These values are
summarized in Table 1. Substituting those values of the parameters in the above expression
(6), the stationary solutions for the tax levels can be estimated.
However, previously, and because the selectivity parameters are unknown, we must assume
some value for them. Regarding trawling, this fleet catches mainly smaller‐sized individuals,
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as mentioned in the previous sections, and therefore has a negative impact on the Southern
stock hake population by preventing a greater number of young fish from reaching maturity
and being able to spawn for next years. On that basis, we will assume a selectivity parameter
value for this fleet initially closer to unit value than to zero, in particular γ1=0.7.
Regarding the artisanal fleet, although it captures mostly mature individuals, it also captures
a small amount of young individuals. This figure does not reach 10% of the landings [19].
Therefore, we will assume a selectivity value for artisanal fleet closer to zero (0.1).
Expression/value Unit
Hake dynamic 0.82310 0.82310( , )   ( ) 8.9263      
  with  
G X F X aX X
a a
q q q= = =
<
%
%
Trawl technology 0.37744 0.17164
1 120.82804t t th e X=
Artisanal technology 0.12609 0.74163
2 2t t th e X=
Price of trawl landings 4,565 Euros per tonne
Price of artisanal landings 7,482 Euros per tonne
Cost of trawl effort 373 Euros per fishing day
Cost of artisanal effort 419 Euros per fishing day
Discount rate 5 Percentage
“1” indicates trawling and “2” artisanal.
Source: Own compilation from Refs. [19, 21].
Table 1. Parameter values for estimations.
On the contrary, the trawling may improve the selectivity of this gear, as the EC [17] and the
ICES [18] proposed in its management recommendations with a view to improving the pattern
of hake production for this fishery. Accordingly, some options may increase, for example, the
size of the mesh and expand the cod‐end of the fishing nets (the “cod‐end” is the rearmost part
of a trawl net, of net of the same mesh size, having either a cylindrical or a tapering shape). If
this technology improves its fishing selectivity level, the negative effects of its activity on hake
dynamic will decrease. In this case, other possible and lowest values for γ1 can be posed. The
results obtained for different values of parameter γ1 are shown in Table 2.
It can be seen that the tax level on trawling (in euros per fishing day) is higher than that applied
to the artisanal fleet in the scenarios contemplated for selectivity parameter due fundamentally
to the fact that it shows a greater marginal productivity in the effort and a negative effect on
hake biomass. Consequently, it should pay more to fish in the fishery. Furthermore, as the
trawling selectivity improves (γ1→0) and therefore the negative effect of the activity of this
Fisheries and Aquaculture in the Modern World18
fleet on the hake population diminishes, the tax per unit of effort applied to this fleet also
decreases, whereas, for the artisanal fleet, it increases and its effort level decreases.
γ1   X 1t 2t
0.7 31,416 2,389 38
0.6 34,143 2,183 53
0.5 37,116 1,627 83
0.4 37,262 1,075 109
0.3 42,499 1,062 242
0.2 43,014 994 262
“1” indicates trawling and “2” artisanal.
Table 2. Hake biomass (metric tons) and tax levels (euros/day) for different γ1 and γ2 = 0.1.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The intensive exploitation of the fishery resources around the world for the last decades has
shown the natural limitations of the productivity of fish stocks. In this environment with a
depletion of marine resources, economists have been worried about searching for management
tools oriented to change the behavior of fishermen to save the resource and also to maintain a
positive economic return. From an economic point of view, fish populations are treated as
capital assets that can provide flows of income over time. The aim is therefore to determine
the path of exploitation of marine resources in a sustainable way and to incorporate the
biological conditions of the marine resource and institutional conditions of fishing into the
analysis. In this way, the fishing economy has advanced since the first works by Gordon [22]
and Scott [23], which includes biological and institutional conditions of basic form, to the
development raised by Clark [11] and Clark and Munro [24], who introduced the theory of
capital to manage a fishing resource in a dynamic context.
In general, the regulatory mechanisms can be classified into two groups [11]: (1) those that are
directed toward the direct control on the fish stocks as well as to maintain high production
levels and (2) a group of mechanisms that, in addition to indirectly control the size of the stock,
points to sustain activity in economically efficient levels. The methods that have been tradi‐
tionally implemented, such as production quotas, closed seasons, closed zones, and restrictions
on the equipment, correspond to the first group and it has been shown that they have failed
to prevent the overexploitation of fish stocks [25–27]. The allocation of property rights and the
system of taxes (on production or on the inputs) are in the second group. Among the latter,
individual property rights require the creation of markets; the regulator may establish certain
rules with respect to fishery exploitation (distribution of the surplus of the marine resource
among fishermen involved in the fishery) and allow a rights transaction market to emerge to
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ensure that fishermen comply with its conduct selling or buying part of that right. Taxes can
be defined as mechanisms based on the regulation via prices; the essence of these instruments
involves the introduction of a price (cost) linked to the behavior that the regulator wants to
promote or discourage.
In this chapter, we have studied the European hake fishery (Southern stock), where two fishing
fleets are operating using different technologies. We have shown the way in which effort taxes
exercised in this multigear fishery make it possible to reach a socially optimum solution for
this marine resource, introducing a variable into the analysis, which includes the effects of
fishing activity on the natural growth function of the hake population. The efficient stationary
solutions for the hake stock levels, its social value and the effort exercised by the two fleets
involved in the fishery (trawling and artisanal), propose different scenarios with regard to the
selectivity parameter for the fleet that has a more intensive impact on young individuals and
then on marine resource dynamics. If trawling selectivity improves, then the optimum level
of the natural resource and its shadow price increases, whereas the global level of effort
diminishes, increasing that of the trawling fleet and reducing that of the longline fleet [19].
If the present situation is compared to the optimal estimations obtained in this study, it can be
seen that the Southern stock of European hake is being fished in an inefficient way, both from
an economic point of view and the conservation of the natural resource point of view. In
particular, the amount of hake biomass existing at the end of the period studied is significantly
lower than that derived from a socially stationary solution. Even in a few years, landings have
exceeded the spawning hake biomass in Iberian‐Atlantic waters.
To reach socially stationary solutions, we have incorporated an intervention mechanism based
on taxes, particularly a tax based on effort exercised by each fleet. The tax equilibrium level is
directly related to the social value of the fishing resource, with the marginal productivity of
the effort exercised and with the effect that fishing activity has on the natural growth of the
resource. In particular, the tax level on the trawling effort is greater than that applied to the
artisanal fleet, as it is more productive and affects the hake population more negatively.
Therefore, it will pay more to exercise its effort in the fishery. On the contrary, the equilibrium
level obtained for the tax on the effort of the artisanal fleet is lower, as it is less productive and
much more selective. However, when the trawling fleet improves its selectivity, its effort
equilibrium level increases and the optimum tax decreases, to the detriment of the stationary
values that correspond to the artisanal fleet.
In this framework, the proposed regulation involving declines in the level of fishing (reducing
the pressure on the stock of fish) is not usually well received by the fishing industry. However,
an efficient regulation allows maintaining the marine resources in a sustainable way and it will
generate economic income for fishermen. An inefficient situation to an efficient change must
be associated with a policy of income distribution suitable based on the criteria of equity. The
regulation mechanism based on taxes could offer a solution to the externalities associated with
the absence of efficient allocations. Although the analysis shown in this chapter is simple, the
results can orient the regulator to achieve a more rational exploitation of the Southern stock
of hake.
Fisheries and Aquaculture in the Modern World20
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the financial support from FEDER and Xunta de Galicia
(GRC2014/022) and the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2014‐52412‐R and
ECO2013‐44436‐R).
Author details
M. Dolores Garza‐Gil*, Manuel Varela‐Lafuente and Juan C. Surís‐Regueiro
*Address all correspondence to: dgarza@uvigo.es
Department of Applied Economics, University of Vigo, Vigo, Spain
References
[1] Armstrong C, Clark D. 1997. Just fishing? Equity and efficiency in fisheries management
regimes. Marine Resource Economics 12: 203–220.
[2] Garza‐Gil MD. 1998. ITQ systems in multifleet fisheries. An application for Iberoatlantic
hake. Environmental and Resource Economics 15: 93–106.
[3] Costa Duarte C, Brasao A, Pintasilgo P. 2000. Management of the Northern Atlantic
bluefin tuna: an application of C‐Games. Marine Resources Economics 14: 21–36.
[4] Bjorndal T, Lindroos M. 2003. International Management of North Sea Herring. Paper
presented at the 12th Annual Conference of European Association of Environmental
and Resources Economists 2003.
[5] Lleonart J, Recasens L. 1996. Fisheries and Environment in the Mediterranean Sea.
Resources and Environmental Issues Relevant to Mediterranean Fisheries Manage‐
ment. Studies and Reviews General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, No. 66.
Rome: FAO.
[6] Boyce J. 1996. An economic analysis of the fisheries bycatch problem. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 31: 314–336.
[7] Prellezo R, Gallastegui C. 2003. Gear selectivity based regulation in a mixed fishery.
Paper presented at the 12th Annual Conference of European Association of Environ‐
mental and Resource Economists 2003.
[8] Turner MA. 1997. Quota induced discarding in heterogeneous fisheries. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 33: 186–195.
Using Taxes to Manage a Multigear Fishery: An Application to a Spanish Fishery
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/62285
21
[9] Espasa M, Prellezo R. 2003. Fishing technology and optimal distribution of harvest
rates. Environmental and Resource Economics 25: 377–394.
[10] Clark CW. 1980. Towards a predictive model for the economic regulation of commercial
fisheries. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 37: 1111–1129.
[11] Clark CW. 1990. Mathematical Bioeconomics. The Optimal Management of Renewable
Resources. 2th ed. New York: Wiley‐Interscience Publication, 386 pp.
[12] Arnason R. 1989. Minimum information management with help of catch quotas. In:
Neher P, Arnason R, Mollet N, editors. Right Based Fishing. Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, pp. 215–240.
[13] Surís‐Regueiro JC. 1993. Regulation of the Iberoatlantic sardine fishery. Environmental
and Resources Economics 3: 457–470.
[14] Weitzman M. 2002. Landing fee vs. harvest quotas with uncertain fish stocks. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 43: 325–338.
[15] Jensen F, Vestergaard N. 2002. Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case
of illegal landings and discards. Resource and Energy Economics 24: 281–299.
[16] Garza‐Gil MD, Varela‐Lafuente M, Surís‐Regueiro JC. 2003. European hake fishery
bioeconomic management (Southern stock) applying an effort tax. Fisheries Research
60: 199–206.
[17] European Commission. 2003. Proposal for Recovery Measures for Southern Hake.
Brussels: COM 818, Brussels.
[18] ICES. 2015. Hake‐Southern Stock Report. http://www.ices.dk.
[19] Garza‐Gil MD, Varela‐Lafuente M. 2007. Bioeconomic management and fishing
selectivity: an application to the European hake fishery. American Journal of Agricul‐
tural and Biological Sciences 2: 69–74.
[20] Kamien M, Schwartz N. 1991. Dynamic Optimization. The Calculus of Variations and
Optimal Control in Economics and Management. New York: North‐Holland Ed., 377 
pp.
[21] European Union. 2014. Economic Assessment of EU Fisheries Economic Performance
of Selected European Fishing Fleets. Annual Reports. https://stecf.jcr.ec.euro‐
pa.eu.home.
[22] Gordon HS. 1954. The economic theory of a common property resource: the fishery.
Journal of Political Economy 62: 124–142.
[23] Scott A. 1986. Progress in Natural Resource Economics. Clarendon Press.
[24] Clark CW, Munro GR. 1975. The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: a
simplified approach. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2: 92–106.
Fisheries and Aquaculture in the Modern World22
[25] Neher P, Arnason R, Mollet N. 1989. Right Based Fishing. Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
[26] Townsend R.E. 1990. Entry restrictions in the fishery: a survey of the evidence. Land
Economics 66: 359–378.
[27] Wilen J. 1988. Limited entry licensing: a retrospective assessment. Marine Research
Economics 5: 313–324.
Using Taxes to Manage a Multigear Fishery: An Application to a Spanish Fishery
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/62285
23

